

Is There a Special Flashbulb-Memory Mechanism?

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Many people report vivid recollections of the circumstances in which they learned of major events, such as the assassination of President Kennedy, or the assassination attempt on President Reagan. Brown and Kulik (1977) argued that this phenomenon, which they labeled *flashbulb memory*, implies the existence of a special memory mechanism that creates a detailed, permanent record of the individual's experience when triggered by an event exceeding criterial levels of surprise and consequentiality. In this article we evaluate the special-mechanism hypothesis, arguing on empirical and logical grounds that the flashbulb-memory phenomenon does not motivate the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism. We suggest instead that flashbulb memories should be viewed as products of "ordinary" memory mechanisms, and hence as phenomena that may offer insights into the nature of these mechanisms.

Where were you when you learned of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the shooting of Ronald Reagan, or the explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger*? How did you hear about the event? What were you doing at the time? What were your first thoughts upon hearing the news? Many people report that they can remember vividly the circumstances in which they learned of certain major public or personal events, a feat of memory that has intrigued researchers since at least the turn of the century (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Colegrove, 1899; Linton, 1975; Neisser, 1982, 1986a, 1986b; Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Thompson & Cowan, 1986; Winograd & Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978).

Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested that this phenomenon, which they labeled *flashbulb memory*, implies the existence of a special memory mechanism. They argued that the special mechanism, when triggered by an event exceeding criterial levels of surprise and "consequentiality," creates a permanent record of the contents of awareness for the period immediately surrounding the shocking experience. The special-mechanism hypothesis has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years, with some authors endorsing the hypothesis and others noting potential problems. Pillemer (1984), for example, argued in favor of the hypothesis on the basis of data concerning subjects' recollections of the circumstances in which they learned about the assassination attempt on President Reagan. In contrast, Neisser (1982) raised doubts about the accuracy of flashbulb memories, and also pointed out problems with several other aspects of the Brown and Kulik hypothesis. Furthermore, Rubin and Kozin (1984) questioned whether the characteristics of flashbulb memories clearly set these memories apart from other autobiographical memories.

Although a number of important issues have been raised, it remains unclear whether the flashbulb-memory phenome-

non warrants the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism. One reason is that no detailed, coherent formulation of a special-mechanism hypothesis has been set forth. The hypothesis as stated by Brown and Kulik (1977) and discussed in subsequent articles is underdeveloped in several crucial respects, and there is also considerable variation between and even within articles in what is claimed about the mechanism and the memories it produces. A related problem is that discussions of the special-mechanism hypothesis have often failed to engage the critical issue of what would constitute a sufficient basis for positing a special flashbulb-memory mechanism.

As a consequence of these problems, the implications of the evidence and arguments presented in studies of flashbulb memory have not always been clear. For example, Neisser (1982) reported two examples of inaccurate flashbulb memories in support of his argument that these memories are not necessarily veridical. Thompson and Cowan (1986), however, presented evidence that for one of Neisser's examples the inaccuracy is relatively minor, and concluded that this example does not challenge the "basic accuracy of flashbulb memories" (p. 200). Neisser (1986b), in a reply to Thompson and Cowan, disagreed with their conclusions. Unfortunately, the exchange fails to clarify what implications any particular degree of inaccuracy has for the special-mechanism hypothesis. Do a few examples of minor inaccuracy call the hypothesis into serious question? Or does the hypothesis remain unchallenged if the accounts are usually "basically accurate"?

In this article we attempt to evaluate the special-mechanism hypothesis systematically and, more generally, to assess the implications of the flashbulb-memory phenomenon for theories of memory. On the basis of data and arguments, we conclude that the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism is unwarranted. Instead, we suggest, flashbulb memories¹ should be viewed as products of "ordinary" autobiographical memory mechanisms, and hence as phenomena that may offer insights into the nature of these mechanisms.

We thank Roberta Goodman-Schulman, Kathi Hirsh, Brenda Rapp, Scott Sokol, and Molly Treadway for their helpful comments. We also thank the Cognitive Lunch group for an illuminating discussion.

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¹ We will use the term *flashbulb memory* in a theoretically neutral sense, to refer to individuals' recollections of the circumstances in which they learned about surprising and consequential events. It should be understood that our use of this term does not imply anything about the memory processes underlying the recollections.

The Special-Mechanism Hypothesis

Underlying the hypothesis of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism is the following implicit argument: Flashbulb memories have special characteristics, that is, characteristics different from those the memories would have if they were produced by "ordinary" memory mechanisms. These special characteristics imply that the memories are products of a special memory mechanism.

Thus, in evaluating the special-mechanism hypothesis, we must consider the following questions: What claims does the hypothesis make about the characteristics of flashbulb memories? To what extent are these claims warranted by the available evidence? And, if these claims are accepted, do they clearly distinguish flashbulb memories from "ordinary" memories and therefore warrant the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism?

Characteristics of Flashbulb Memories

Statements of the special-mechanism hypothesis are not entirely clear with regard to the characteristics of flashbulb memories, at times pressing strong claims while at other times qualifying these claims. As a starting point for discussion, we will consider one particular interpretation of the Brown and Kulik (1977) hypothesis, an interpretation that makes strong claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories. On this rendering the special flashbulb-memory mechanism, when triggered by critical levels of surprise and consequentiality, creates in memory a detailed and permanent record of the individual's experience immediately before, during, and immediately after learning of the shocking event. (Brown and Kulik, 1977, p. 87, stated that the mechanism records all "brain events above some level of organization," apparently meaning something like the contents of awareness, including such information as where the individual was, what he or she was doing, etc.) The representations created by the special mechanism are complete, accurate, vivid, and immune to forgetting (i.e., the stored information, in its original veridical form, remains permanently accessible).

One could certainly formulate weaker interpretations of Brown and Kulik's (1977) position (e.g., flashbulb memories are impressively, although not perfectly, complete, accurate, vivid, and resistant to forgetting). However, we consider the strong claims first because these claims, if supportable, would make the most convincing case for the position that flashbulb memories are so remarkable that a special memory mechanism must be posited to account for them. If the strong claims prove untenable, we can then consider whether weaker claims motivate the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism.²

We begin our evaluation of the strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories by reporting a study aimed at evaluating these claims.

Flashbulb Memories for the Explosion of the Space Shuttle

With one exception (Pillemer, 1984), studies of flashbulb memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Colegrove, 1899; Winograd

& Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978) have probed subjects' memories for the circumstances in which they learned of an event only once, long after the event. Yet, as Neisser (1982) has pointed out, this procedure does not permit the accuracy of the subjects' reports to be assessed. Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether the amount of remembered information remains constant over time, as it should if flashbulb memories are immune to forgetting, or whether subjects' memories instead become less detailed and complete as time passes.

Potentially more informative is a procedure in which subjects are questioned twice, once shortly after a surprising, consequential event, and again some time later, as in Pillemer's (1984) study concerning the Reagan assassination attempt. The two sets of responses may then be compared with regard to amount and consistency of information reported on the two occasions. The explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger* on January 28, 1986, tragically provided the opportunity to carry out a study of this sort. The flight of *Challenger* was highly publicized because the crew included the teacher Christa McAuliffe. Furthermore, the explosion was completely unexpected and had important consequences for the space program and, more generally, for public confidence in government, science, and technology. Thus, with regard to surprise and consequentiality, the presumed triggering conditions for the special flashbulb-memory mechanism, the shuttle explosion appears comparable to the events used in previous studies of flashbulb memory (e.g., the Reagan assassination attempt, assassinations of other political leaders). Indeed, the disaster was widely described in the media as one of those events for which people remember where they were and what they were doing when they learned of it. In the present study we probed subjects' memory for circumstances of learning about the shuttle explosion a few days after the explosion, and again 9 months later.

Method

Questionnaire. The questionnaire presented to subjects included four questions about the circumstances under which the respondent learned of the explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger*:

1. Where were you when you first learned of the explosion?

² It might be suggested that the strong claims we have formulated about characteristics of flashbulb memories are stronger than Brown and Kulik (1977) intended. For example, whereas the strong claims characterize flashbulb memories as complete records of the individual's experience around the time of learning about a surprising, consequential event, Brown and Kulik (1977, pp. 74-75, 85) stated that flashbulb memories vary in "elaboration," suggesting that under some circumstances these memories could be less than complete. However, Brown and Kulik also repeatedly assert (e.g., see Brown & Kulik, 1977, pp. 76, 95-96) that the flashbulb-memory mechanism records all recent brain events. Thus, potential conflicts between the strong claims we have formulated and statements made by Brown and Kulik reflect ambiguities in their claims. In any event, regardless of what Brown and Kulik intended, it is important to consider strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories because, as stated earlier, these claims would provide the firmest basis for asserting that flashbulb memories are very different from ordinary memories.

2. What were you doing when you first learned of the explosion?
3. Did you see the event at the time it was actually happening, or did you learn about it later? If later, how did you learn about it?
4. What were your first thoughts upon hearing the news?

We will refer to these items collectively as the circumstances questions, and individually as the location, activity, source, and reaction questions, respectively. For each question subjects were asked to rate their confidence in the correctness of their answers on a scale from 1 (*low confidence*) to 7 (*high confidence*).

The four circumstances questions were intended to probe categories of information that should be included in memories generated by a mechanism that records the contents of awareness for the period immediately surrounding the learning about a surprising, consequential event. Previous studies have focused on six "canonical categories" of information: place, ongoing event, information, own affect, affect in others, and aftermath (see, e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Pillemer, 1984). Our location, activity, and source questions closely correspond to the first three of these categories, respectively, and our reaction question corresponds roughly to the own affect category. We did not probe affect in others or aftermath, because information in these categories may not always be available to be recorded, at least within the span of time over which a special flashbulb-memory mechanism would operate. For example, a person who heard a radio announcement about the shuttle explosion while alone might have no experience of affect in others to remember.

The questionnaire also included a single question about the respondent's memory for his or her whereabouts at the time of the assassination attempt on President Reagan.

These five critical questions (the four shuttle circumstances questions and the single question about the Reagan assassination attempt) occurred in identical form on both the initial and 9-month questionnaires. Instructions on both questionnaires stressed that answers should be as specific as possible.

Both questionnaires also included several additional questions, most of which concerned the sources from which the respondent obtained information about the shuttle disaster subsequent to initially learning about it, and the details of the shuttle flight itself. The results for these questions are not relevant for our purposes and therefore will not be discussed.

Design and procedure. On January 31, 1986, three days after the explosion, questionnaires were distributed to 50 faculty, postdoctoral fellows, graduate students, undergraduate students, and support staff associated with the Psychology Department of Johns Hopkins University. Forty-five of these "immediate" questionnaires (90%) were returned within 1 week of the shuttle disaster.

On October 21, 1986, approximately 9 months after the explosion, follow-up questionnaires were distributed to the 29 subjects who (a) had returned the immediate questionnaire within 1 week of the explosion and (b) were still available at the time of the follow-up. Twenty-seven subjects (93%) completed the 9-month questionnaire. These subjects will be referred to as the *repeated testing* group.

To assess effects of completing the immediate questionnaire on responses given at 9 months, the 9-month questionnaire was also distributed to 35 individuals who had not received the immediate questionnaire. Thirty-one (89%) completed the questionnaire. These subjects will be referred to as the *9-month-only* group.

Results

Answers to the location, activity, source, and reaction questions were first scored simply as substantive or "don't remember" responses. A response was scored as substantive if it provided an answer to the question, even if the response was not highly specific. For example, "at work" as well as "Lever-

ing Hall next to the news stand" was scored as a substantive answer to the location question. This scoring criterion appears to be consistent with those used in previous studies (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Pillemer, 1984) to assess whether a subject provided information in a canonical category. Because some subjects reported information relevant to one of the circumstances questions in an answer to another of these questions, the scoring for each question took account of any relevant information the subject provided in answers to other questions.

Nine-month responses. Table 1 presents, for the repeated testing subjects on the immediate and 9-month questionnaires, and for the 9-month-only subjects on the 9-month questionnaire, the proportion of subjects who offered substantive responses to each of the circumstances questions. From the 9-month results, it is clear that the explosion of *Challenger* is an event for which the flashbulb-memory phenomenon occurs: 9 months after the shuttle explosion most subjects could provide reports concerning where they were, what they were doing, how they heard, and how they reacted when they learned of the disaster.

All subjects in both groups gave substantive answers to at least two of the four questions; 22 of the 27 repeated-testing subjects (81%) and 26 of the 31 9-month-only subjects (84%) gave substantive responses to all four questions. Subjects were also highly confident about their responses. Across the four circumstances questions, mean confidence for substantive answers was 6.13 (on a scale with 7 as the highest confidence level) for the repeated-testing group, and 6.16 for the 9-month-only group.

Brown and Kulik (1977) scored a subject as having a flashbulb memory for an event if the subject (a) answered "yes" to the question, "Do you recall the circumstances in which you first heard that [event]?", and (b) provided information in at least one of the six canonical information categories in reporting these circumstances. Assuming that any subject who gave a substantive response to one or more of our circumstances questions would have given a "yes" answer to a question of the form "Do you recall the circumstances in which you first heard that the space shuttle *Challenger* had exploded?", then by the Brown and Kulik criteria all of our repeated-testing and 9-month-only subjects have flashbulb memories for the space shuttle explosion.

Table 1
Proportion of Repeated Testing and 9-Month-Only Subjects Providing Substantive Responses to the Circumstances Questions on the Immediate and 9-Month Questionnaires

Question	Repeated testing		9-month only
	Immediate questionnaire	9-month questionnaire	9-month questionnaire
Location	1.00	.96	.94
Activity	1.00	.89	.87
Source	1.00	1.00	1.00
Reaction	.96	.89	.97
<i>M</i>	.99	.94	.94

Comparison of the 9-month results for the repeated-testing group and the 9-month-only group suggests that completing the immediate questionnaire had little if any effect on the 9-month responses of the repeated-testing group. The mean number of questions answered substantively was 3.74 (out of 4) for the repeated-testing group and 3.77 for the 9-month-only group, $t < 1$. Furthermore, confidence did not differ across groups (see earlier results on confidence levels).

Comparison of immediate and 9-month responses. The 9-month results paint a seemingly impressive picture of subjects' ability to remember the circumstances in which they learned of the shuttle explosion. However, comparison of the 9-month responses with those given shortly after the explosion reveals that the amount of stored information subjects could access decreased over the retention interval, and further that the immediate and 9-month responses were not always consistent.

For each of the 107 circumstances questions answered substantively on the immediate questionnaire (27 subjects times 4 circumstances questions, minus a single reaction question answered "don't remember"), two independent judges compared the immediate response with the corresponding 9-month response.

A 9-month response was scored as the *same* as the corresponding immediate response if it provided basically the same information (although not necessarily in the same wording). A relatively lax criterion was applied, so that, for example, the responses "reading" and "studying" to the activity question were scored as the same.

A 9-month response was scored as *more specific* than the immediate response if it was not inconsistent with the immediate response, but answered the question at a finer level of detail, or included particular pieces of information not reported on the immediate questionnaire. For example, the 9-month response "eating lunch (actually, drinking coffee) with S____ S____, S____ D____, and M____ M____" to the activity question was scored as more specific than the immediate response "eating lunch with some friends."

Similarly, a 9-month response was scored as *more general* than the corresponding immediate response if it was not inconsistent with the immediate response, but was less specific, or omitted particular details. For example, the 9-month response "word of mouth" was scored as more general than the immediate response "heard C____ talking about it."

A 9-month response was scored as *inconsistent* if it contradicted the corresponding immediate response in some (although not necessarily all) respects. For example, the 9-month response "at my desk" to the location question was scored as inconsistent with the immediate response "walking out of the door toward B____'s office."

Finally, a 9-month response was scored as *don't remember* if the question was answered substantively on the immediate questionnaire but given a "don't remember" response on the 9-month questionnaire.

The two judges agreed on 86% of the initial classification decisions. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. For some ambiguous responses, the subject was consulted for clarification. For example, one subject indicated that the 9-month response "examining some data for an experiment" did not refer to the same activity as the immediate response

Table 2

Comparison of Immediate and 9-Month Responses for Repeated-Testing Subjects

Question	Relationship of 9-month response to immediate response				
	Same	More specific	More general	Inconsistent	Don't remember
Location	21	1	2	2	1
Activity	15	1	4	4	3
Source	16	3	7	1	0
Reaction	13	2	7	2	2
Total	65	7	20	9	6

"designing an experiment." Table 2 presents for each of the four circumstances questions the number of responses falling into each of the scoring categories.

Although there is considerable consistency over the 9-month retention interval, there is also substantial evidence of forgetting and inaccuracy. First, the data for "don't remember" responses clearly reveal forgetting over the retention interval. On the immediate questionnaire, 26 of the 27 repeated-testing subjects provided a substantive answer to all four circumstances questions, and the remaining subject gave a substantive response to three of the four questions. On the 9-month questionnaire, however, 4 of the 27 subjects (15.4%) gave "don't remember" responses to a total of 6 questions they had answered substantively on the immediate questionnaire.

Further evidence of forgetting may be found by comparing the frequency of more specific and more general responses. If the accessible information remains constant over time, there should be no systematic difference between the immediate and 9-month questionnaires in specificity of responses. That is, although corresponding immediate and 9-month responses may occasionally vary in specificity due to variation in subjects' decisions about how much of the accessible information to report, we would expect the number of responses that became more specific at 9 months to be approximately the same as the number that became more general. On the other hand, if the amount of accessible information decreased over the interval between questionnaires, we might expect a systematic shift toward more general responses on the 9-month questionnaire. This is just what we found. Whereas only 7 responses became more specific, 20 became more general ($p < .01$ by binomial test).

Finally, subjects' confidence ratings provide additional suggestive, although by no means definitive, evidence of forgetting: Confidence in substantive answers declined over the retention interval, with a mean across the four circumstances questions of 6.84 on the immediate questionnaire, and 6.13 on the 9-month questionnaire, $t(26) = 2.84$, $p < .01$.

The comparison of immediate and 9-month responses also revealed a number of inconsistencies. On the 9-month questionnaire, 7 of the 27 repeated-testing subjects (25.9%) gave a total of 9 responses (8.4% of the 107 total responses) that were inconsistent with the corresponding immediate responses. For example, one subject reported on the immediate questionnaire that she learned of the explosion when "my

husband telephoned me to ask if I saw it," but stated on the 9-month questionnaire that "I did not see the actual launch but a little while after the explosion the TV news made a statement concerning the shuttle." (See the discussion of scoring for two other examples of inconsistency.)

Subjects were often quite confident about their inconsistent 9-month responses; these responses clearly were not offered as guesses. Three of the 9 inconsistent responses were given with confidence ratings of 7, and the mean over the 9 responses was 5.22. Confidence in incorrect recollections was also apparent when we interviewed subjects to determine whether apparently inconsistent responses were in fact inconsistent. For example, the subject who reported his ongoing activity as "designing an experiment" on the immediate questionnaire but as "examining some data for an experiment" on the 9-month questionnaire was asked 16 months after the shuttle explosion what he was doing when he learned of the explosion. No information about his previous responses was given. The subject replied that he remembered vividly sitting at his desk looking at the data from an experiment. Shown his initial response, he was surprised, and confirmed that his current memory was inconsistent with his original report.

Although the 9-month responses scored as inconsistent were clearly discrepant with the corresponding immediate responses, none were grossly incongruent.³ Thus, the inconsistencies do not imply that flashbulb memories are often complete confabulations, but instead suggest that these memories are subject to the same sorts of reconstructive errors that seem to occur frequently for "ordinary" memories. That is, for flashbulb memories, as for other memories, inaccuracies may be introduced when information that cannot be retrieved from memory is filled in through inference or guesswork. Further, the reconstructed information may be stored in memory and recalled (perhaps with high confidence) on subsequent occasions.

In using subjects' immediate responses as the standard for assessing the accuracy of the 9-month responses, we are assuming that the immediate responses are accurate. Of course, this may not always be the case, given that the "immediate" questionnaires were completed between 3 and 7 days after the explosion. However, the risk we take in assuming that the immediate reports are accurate is one of underestimating the amount of inaccuracy at nine months: If immediate reports are sometimes inaccurate, then some 9-month reports that are the same as the corresponding immediate reports may be inaccurate.

More generally, our results should probably be viewed as placing a lower bound on the amount of forgetting and inaccuracy that occurred over the 9-month period following the shuttle explosion. In addition to the possibility that some of the immediate reports are inaccurate, it is possible that some of the responses that became more specific on the 9-month questionnaire did so through the importation of inaccurate information. Furthermore, when subjects give consistent but rather general responses on both occasions, these responses may conceal forgetting and inaccuracy. For example, if a subject reports on both questionnaires that he was walking to class with some friends when he learned of the shuttle explosion, we have no way of knowing whether he had

the same particular friends in mind both times, or whether he even remembers who the friends were.

These points were brought home to us with some force when we described our study at an informal seminar attended by several of the individuals who had served as subjects. A discussion ensued about the particular flashbulb memories of some of the seminar participants, in the course of which it became apparent that the memories of our subjects, as well as those of other individuals who did not participate in the experiment, were often rather vague, and frequently inconsistent with one another. (In the following account names have been changed to protect the forgetful.) Susan, one of the repeated-testing subjects, reported on the immediate questionnaire that she was eating lunch with some friends in the university cafeteria when she learned of the explosion. On the 9-month questionnaire, she stated that she was eating lunch in the cafeteria with John, Beth, and Jennifer. Thus, her 9-month response was scored as more specific than her immediate response. However, Tim, who was not a subject in the experiment, stated at the seminar that he was eating with John when he learned of the explosion, but did not remember Susan, Beth, or Jennifer being there. Beth, contacted by telephone, stated that she was elsewhere at lunch that day.

John, questioned after the seminar, reported that he was eating lunch with Susan and a few other people when he learned of the explosion, but did not remember Tim being there. Furthermore, John initially did not think that Jennifer was present at the lunch, although he later conceded that she may have been. (John, a repeated-testing subject, did not list his luncheon companions on either questionnaire, and his immediate and 9-month activity responses were scored as the same). Jennifer, who was not a subject in the experiment, reported that she did eat lunch with John that day, but did not remember Susan being there and instead believed that Phil and Roger were present. Phil, a repeated-testing subject, stated that he ate lunch in his office that day, and learned of the explosion from the radio. Roger, who was not a subject in the study, also reported that he does not remember eating lunch in the cafeteria on the day of the shuttle explosion, and stated that he learned of the explosion in the psychology building when someone told him. Roger further indicated that he believed David was the person who gave him the news, but Linda states that she is the one who informed Roger. Asked whether it could have been Linda who told him, Roger conceded the possibility but stated that he did not

³ Similarly, Neisser's inaccurate memory for learning of the attack on Pearl Harbor is apparently not grossly inaccurate: Neisser recalls that he was listening to a baseball game on the radio, when in fact he was probably listening to a football game (see Neisser, 1982, 1986b; Thompson & Cowan, 1986). Linton (1975) describes another example of an inaccurate flashbulb memory, in which an acquaintance reported that Linton was the source of his information about the assassination of President Kennedy, when according to documentary evidence (and Linton's own memories), Linton was elsewhere at the time. However, no information is available about the circumstances in which Linton's acquaintance actually learned of the Kennedy assassination, and thus we have no way of knowing to what extent the memory was inaccurate.

specifically remember her telling him. Clearly, these accounts are not entirely complete and consistent.

The final point to be made about the data from the shuttle circumstances questions is that the forgetting and inaccuracy apparent in these data were not limited to responses about which the subject was uncertain on the immediate questionnaire. If we restrict the analysis to the 89 responses for which the subject gave a confidence rating of 7 on the immediate questionnaire, the pattern of results is almost identical to that for the full set of responses: 55 (61.8%) same responses, 6 (6.7%) more specific responses, 17 (19.1%) more general responses, 8 (9.0%) inconsistent responses, and 3 (3.4%) don't remember responses.

The Reagan assassination attempt. In addition to asking about the circumstances in which subjects learned of the space shuttle explosion, we also asked a single question about subjects' memories for their whereabouts at the time of the Reagan assassination attempt. The assassination attempt occurred on March 30, 1981, roughly 5 years prior to the present study. For the repeated-testing group, 13 of the 27 subjects (48.2%) gave a substantive response on the immediate questionnaire; 15 (55.6%) responded substantively on the 9-month questionnaire. (Interestingly, 2 subjects gave a don't remember response on the initial questionnaire and a substantive response 9 months later.) For the 9-month-only group, 17 of the 31 subjects (54.8%) gave a substantive response. Finally, for the 18 subjects who completed the immediate questionnaire but not the 9-month questionnaire, 9 (50%) gave a substantive response.

These percentages are considerably lower than those obtained by Pillemer (1984) for subjects questioned 1 and 7 months after the Reagan assassination attempt. Pillemer (personal communication) found that 96% of the subjects (80 of 83) tested 1 month after the assassination attempt and 85% of the subjects (70 of 82) tested at 7 months could report where they were when they learned of the incident.

Note that whereas Pillemer's (1984) subjects were faculty at Wellesley College, our subjects were faculty, students, staff, and others associated with the Johns Hopkins Psychology Department. Perhaps, then, differences between the subjects in the two studies are responsible for the lower incidence of flashbulb memories in our study than in Pillemer's. However, examination of our data provides no support for this interpretation. Eight of our subjects were university faculty at the time of Pillemer's study in 1981, and hence may reasonably be considered comparable to Pillemer's subjects. Only three of these subjects—37.5%—could report their whereabouts at the time of the Reagan assassination attempt.

Of course, caution must be exercised in comparing absolute performance levels across studies. However, the difference between studies in the incidence of flashbulb memories is sufficiently large to suggest that between the time of Pillemer's (1984) study a few months after the assassination attempt on Reagan, and the time of our study approximately 5 years later, considerable forgetting of the circumstances of learning about the assassination attempt occurred. (Note also that Pillemer's data show a decline over the interval between the 1- and 7-month questionnaire in the percentage of subjects who could report their location at the time of the assassination

attempt.) Thus, the assassination attempt data argue against the claim that flashbulb memories are immune to forgetting.⁴

Our results for the assassination attempt question also provide further evidence that flashbulb memories may be inaccurate. Of the 13 repeated-testing subjects who gave a substantive response to the question on both the immediate and 9-month questionnaires, 2 (15.4%) gave inconsistent responses. For example, on the immediate questionnaire one subject responded as follows:

I was in the Department of Hearing and Speech Sciences, University of _____. Specifically I was either in my office or giving a speech therapy session when told. However, I can really only picture myself in the videotape room watching the assassination attempt on one of the video TV's. (That actually seems like where I was when I first learned about it, but I know that in reality I was only watching it at that time because I had already heard about it and wanted to hear/see what happened.)

On the 9-month questionnaire, the subject gave a somewhat different answer:

I was rewinding a speech therapy tape in the TV room at the Univ. of _____. I believe it was in the morning (9:30–10:30) and I was watching TV and saw the news flash right away after it happened.

The television report, which the subject initially said she saw after being told of the assassination attempt, is now remembered as the original source of the news. Interestingly, at the time of the initial account the watching of the television report was apparently the most vivid part of the subject's memory and seemed "like where I was when I first learned about it." Note also that the second report corresponds more closely than the first to the stereotype of a flashbulb memory: The later account is more detailed and less tentative.

The subject was questioned again in June 1987, 8 months after completing the 9-month questionnaire. At this time she provided an account very similar to her 9-month report. When she was then informed of her previous accounts, she stated that she thought her initial report—that someone else told her of the assassination attempt—was incorrect, because she was the one who told everyone else. She also provided additional details, stating that she was in the TV room pre-

⁴ In October, 1982, Rubin and Kozin (1984) asked college students whether they had flashbulb memory for several events, including the Reagan assassination attempt. Fifty percent reported a flashbulb memory for the assassination attempt. However, in Rubin and Kozin's study the subject was first given a definition of a flashbulb memory (e.g., "A flashbulb memory occurs when your brain 'takes a picture' of an event. You have particularly vivid memories of these events long after they occur. You tend to remember your surroundings in exceptional detail"; Rubin & Kozin, 1984, p. 85), and was then asked for each of the events whether his or her memory for the event was a flashbulb memory. Thus, the Rubin and Kozin procedure defines a much higher criterion than our procedure, or that of Pillemer (1984). Presumably, to report a flashbulb memory for the Reagan assassination attempt, a subject in Rubin and Kozin's study not only had to remember the circumstances in which he or she learned of the event, but had to remember these circumstances vividly and in exceptional detail. Consequently, Rubin and Kozin's results cannot be compared directly with either our results or Pillemer's.

paring to videotape an upcoming session with a client. Further, she said, she clearly remembered the client, a 12-year-old boy with a fluency disorder whom she always saw on Wednesdays. However, reference to a calendar indicated that Reagan was shot on a Monday. Furthermore, a check of speech therapy records revealed that whereas the assassination attempt occurred in the spring of 1981, the client our subject clearly remembers working with on the day of the incident was someone she first met the following fall.

Discussion

In probing subjects' memories for the circumstances of learning about the space shuttle explosion and the Reagan assassination attempt, our principal aim was to assess the strong claims that flashbulb memories are complete, accurate, vivid, and immune to forgetting. In the following sections we discuss these claims in light of our results and the results of previous studies.

Accuracy and immunity to forgetting. Our data clearly indicate that flashbulb memories are neither uniformly accurate nor immune to forgetting. The results suggest that like other memories, memories for the circumstances of learning about a surprising, consequential event are subject to reconstructive errors, and to a decline over time in the amount of information that can be retrieved from memory.

In contrast, most previous studies of flashbulb memory (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Colegrove, 1899; Pillemer, 1984; Yarmey & Bull, 1978) have emphasized the longevity of the memories, and have assumed that they are accurate. However, the procedures used in these studies were simply not adequate to detect forgetting and inaccuracy. With the exception of Pillemer's (1984) study, previous flashbulb memory studies have probed subjects' memories only once, long after the event or events of interest. These studies have found that high proportions of subjects can report at least some information about the circumstances in which they learned of surprising, consequential events. This finding, which constitutes the major empirical basis for claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories, was also obtained in the present study: Nine months after the space shuttle explosion, all of our subjects could report some information about the circumstances in which they learned of the event. However, the ability of subjects to report at least some information about the circumstances of learning about an event does not demonstrate that their memories for these circumstances are immune to forgetting; whatever information subjects report on a questionnaire may be far less than they could have reported at an earlier time. This is especially true when, as we found (see also Pillemer, 1984, p. 71), subjects' reports are often vague and general. Furthermore, as Neisser (1982) has argued, and our findings amply illustrate, the ability of subjects to provide accounts of the circumstances in which they learned of surprising, consequential events does not ensure that these accounts are accurate.

Pillemer questioned subjects twice about the assassination attempt on Reagan, 1 month and 7 months after the event. He reported a high incidence of flashbulb memories, and emphasized that subjects' reports were quite consistent over

the 6-month interval between questionnaires. However, Pillemer's results are actually quite consistent with our findings, and support our conclusion that flashbulb memories are subject to forgetting and inaccuracy. With regard to forgetting, the percentage of subjects who responded "yes" when asked if they recalled the circumstances in which they learned of the assassination attempt declined over the 6-month interval between Pillemer's 1- and 7-month questionnaires. Furthermore, even among the subjects who responded "yes" on both questionnaires, the mean number of canonical informational categories and the mean number of words provided in free reports of recollections decreased over the interval between questionnaires, as did the mean number of substantive responses to specific questions concerning the canonical categories. With regard to inaccuracy, comparison of 1-month and 7-month responses to the six specific questions about canonical information categories revealed inconsistency for an average of 1.12 of the 6 responses per subject (19%).

Completeness. The strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories hold that the flashbulb-memory mechanism creates a detailed record of all material to which the individual was attending immediately before, during, and immediately after learning of the event in question. This claim is entirely without empirical support, in part because the criteria that researchers have used to classify a memory as a flashbulb memory are orders of magnitude weaker than the claim would appear to require. Typically, a subject is classified as having a flashbulb memory for an event if the subject answers "yes" to a question of the form, "Do you recall the circumstances in which you first heard of [event]?", and provides any information in at least one of the six canonical informational categories defined by Brown and Kulik (1977; i.e., place, ongoing event, informant, own affect, affect in others, aftermath). Even if we ignore problems associated with potential inaccuracy in subjects' reports, these criteria obviously fail to ensure that a memory classified as a flashbulb memory is a detailed record of the individual's conscious experience around the time of learning about the event in question. The subject is not required to report information in all of the categories (which in any event were not selected on the basis of an analysis of the sorts of information the posited mechanism should record), or to provide detailed information in any category. Thus, for example, a subject whose report of the circumstances in which she learned of the Kennedy assassination consisted solely of the statement "I was at work" (or perhaps even "I was in Baltimore"; see Winograd & Killinger, 1983) would be scored as having a flashbulb memory.

The weakness of the classification criteria might be of little consequence if subjects typically provided accounts that were far more detailed and complete than required to meet the criteria. However, this does not appear to be the case. In the Brown and Kulik (1977) study, for example, subjects gave free reports of their recollections about 10 different events. The mean number of informational categories per report ranged from 1.6 to 5.6 across the 10 events; for most events the mean was less than 3. Thus, subjects did not uniformly or even typically provide information in all six categories.

Even when subjects provide information in a category, the information may be very vague and general. For example,

Pillemer (1984) noted that his subjects' substantive responses to questions about canonical information categories were often "short and unspecific" (Pillemer, 1984, p. 71). As discussed earlier this was also true in the present study. Thus, the available data provide no basis for the claim that memories for the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential events preserve the contents of awareness for a period extending from shortly before to shortly after learning of the event.

Of course, vague, incomplete responses to questionnaire items do not necessarily imply vague, incomplete memories; subjects may not report all of the details they recall when writing answers to questionnaire items. However, this point in no way alters the fact that the completeness claim is entirely without empirical support. Furthermore, several observations suggest that incompleteness is a characteristic not merely of subjects' questionnaire reports but also of the information they can recall. First, the "don't remember" responses given by some of our subjects to specific questionnaire items (e.g., What were you doing when you first learned of the explosion?; see Table 2) cannot readily be explained in terms of mere failure to report remembered details. Furthermore, in the interviews we conducted to follow up ambiguous questionnaire responses and to pursue apparent inconsistencies in the seminar discussion of flashback memories for the shuttle explosion, we encountered numerous instances in which individuals failed to remember, or were uncertain about, various aspects of the circumstances of learning about the explosion of the space shuttle. Finally, it is clear to us that our own flashback memories for the shuttle explosion, although generally quite detailed, have significant gaps. For example, Michael McCloskey remembers learning of the explosion when two colleagues came into his office around lunchtime, but cannot recall what he was doing when they walked in, or even which of them told him the news. Neal Cohen recalls that he learned of the explosion when someone listening to the radio shouted out the news, but does not remember whether he saw the person who shouted, or only heard the voice. Further, although Cohen remembers speaking to some other people immediately after learning of the explosion, he cannot remember who they were. Many of our other flashback memories, especially those for less recent events, are considerably more fragmentary. Similarly, Brown and Kulik (1977, p. 75) describe lacunae in their flashback memories for the assassination of President Kennedy.

It might be suggested that gaps in individuals' recollections reflect forgetting, and not incompleteness in the originally created memories. However, from the perspective of the strong claims about the characteristics of flashback memories this would constitute a step from the frying pan into the fire: In the attempt to save the completeness claim, the claim of immunity to forgetting is sacrificed. Alternatively, it might be argued that details missing from flashback memories are details that simply were not among the contents of awareness at the time of learning about the event in question, and so were never recorded by the special flashback memory mechanism. However, this argument is thoroughly unpersuasive; for example, it is hard to argue that McCloskey was unaware of which of his two colleagues told him of the shuttle explo-

sion, or that Cohen was unaware of the identities of the people to whom he spoke just after learning of the explosion. Thus, the claim that flashback memories preserve a complete representation of the contents of awareness around the time of learning about a surprising, consequential event is not only unsupported, but in fact difficult to maintain in the face of the available evidence.

Vividness. Most discussions of flashback memory repeatedly emphasize that these memories are exceptionally vivid (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1978; Pillemer, 1984; Winograd & Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978). For example, Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested that flashback memories for President Kennedy's assassination almost always have "a primary, 'live' quality that is almost perceptual" (p. 74). Hence, vividness has been treated as another attribute that distinguishes flashback memories from memories produced by ordinary mechanisms. However, once again the available data fail to motivate this claim; the criteria used by researchers to classify memories as flashback memories have typically not included any requirement that the memories be vivid. Furthermore, Rubin and Kozin (1984) have found that memories involving surprising, consequential events are not often among those reported by subjects who are asked to describe their most vivid memories.

To summarize, we have shown that contrary to the strong claims of accuracy and immunity to forgetting, flashback memories are subject to inaccuracy and forgetting. Moreover, we have argued that claims of completeness and vividness are, at best, entirely without empirical support. We conclude, therefore, that the strong claims about characteristics of flashback memories cannot be offered as grounds for postulating a special flashback-memory mechanism.

A potential counterargument. Our conclusions might be called into question on grounds that we have failed to separate the wheat from the chaff in our data. Specifically, it might be argued that the special flashback-memory mechanism does not "fire" for everyone at the time of learning about an event such as the space shuttle explosion or even the assassination of President Kennedy; for some individuals the criterial levels of surprise and consequentiality may not be achieved. Thus, the data on which our conclusions are based may constitute a mixture of some memories created by the special flashback-memory mechanism and some memories created by ordinary memory mechanisms. If this were the case, it would not be surprising that the data show some inaccuracies, gaps, and decreases over time in the amount of information that could be reported. These findings would simply reflect the fact that some subjects with memories created by ordinary memory mechanisms were mixed with subjects having complete, accurate, vivid, and permanent memories created by the special flashback-memory mechanism.

This "wheat versus chaff" argument does not stand up to scrutiny. First, simply to dismiss as products of ordinary memory mechanisms any memories that do not evidence the characteristics posited on the strong construal of the special-mechanism hypothesis serves only to render the claim that flashback memories have these characteristics entirely circular. The argument merits serious consideration only if criteria independent of claims about characteristics of flashback mem-

ories can be specified for distinguishing true flashbulb memories (i.e., memories created by the presumed special mechanism) from memories created by ordinary memory mechanisms. It might of course be suggested that flashbulb and ordinary memories could be distinguished by assessing for each individual subject whether the subject experienced high levels of surprise and consequentiality. However, it has not been demonstrated that assessments of surprise and consequentiality (or any other criteria) would in fact partition memories into two distinct classes, one made up of true flashbulb memories that are complete, accurate, and immune to forgetting, and the other of ordinary memories that evidence gaps, forgetting, and inaccuracy. In the absence of such a demonstration the wheat versus chaff argument represents, at best, a promissory note.⁵

A second problem is that the argument offers no response whatever to one of our two major points. We asserted not only that our results provide evidence against some of the strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories, but also that even the data usually taken as support for these claims fail to motivate them. Even if the present data (or, for that matter, any other data showing inaccuracy and forgetting) could be dismissed as reflecting memory representations created by ordinary memory mechanisms, the strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories would remain unsupported: One will search the flashbulb-memory literature in vain for data demonstrating completeness, accuracy, vividness, and immunity to forgetting for a single memory in a single individual.

Weaker Claims as a Basis for the Special-Mechanism Hypothesis

Given that the strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories are untenable, we may ask whether postulation of a special mechanism can be motivated on the basis of weaker claims. Consider, then, the following formulation of the special-mechanism hypothesis: People can often provide, months or years after a surprising and consequential event, reasonably detailed, accurate, and vivid reports of the circumstances in which they learned about the event. Although imperfect, recall seems far better than would be expected if it were based upon memories created by ordinary memory mechanisms, and so points to the operation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that these weaker claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories are defensible. Given this assumption, the central question is whether these characteristics clearly distinguish flashbulb memories from memories produced by ordinary memory mechanisms. To address this question we need to know what the special-mechanism hypothesis claims about the characteristics of memories produced by ordinary memory mechanisms, and we need to know the basis for the claims.

Brown and Kulik (1977) and Pillemer (1984) seem to have assumed that memories for the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential events would, if created by ordinary memory mechanisms, be just like (i.e., just as poor

as) memories for the humdrum circumstances of everyday life. Pillemer, for example, made the following statement:

What is remembered about personal circumstances (as opposed to the actual newsworthy event) often is inconsequential, and is really nothing to recount to others (unless a psychologist happens by). Why these mundane, private experiences are remembered *at all* is what was in need of explanation in the first place. (Pillemer, 1984, p. 77, italics added)

This conclusion appears to reflect a tendency to view the circumstances of learning about a newsworthy event from within a framework that focuses narrowly on the event itself. Within this framework the circumstances of learning about the event are seen as incidental (relative to the central information about the event itself), and the significance of these circumstances is evaluated by applying the criteria used to assess the significance of the event itself. This perspective is illustrated clearly in a statement by Pillemer (1984):

But what information do these recollections [of learning about a surprising, consequential event] convey? They do not portray *social or political consequences, but rather the individual's own behaviors and reactions at the time*. One's location upon first hearing, what one was doing, how one found out, one's feelings—why are mundane personal circumstances so vividly remembered years later? (Pillemer, 1984, p. 65)

Viewed in this way, the circumstances of learning about a newsworthy event do indeed seem inconsequential and non-memorable.

If we view matters from a slightly different perspective, however, it is no longer obvious that ordinary memory mechanisms would yield very poor memory for the circumstances of learning about a surprising, consequential event. Learning about such an event is itself an event: a personal experience. For example, a memory of the circumstances of learning about the space shuttle explosion is a memory for the experience of learning about the explosion. While the experience

⁵ There is some evidence to suggest that surprise and consequentiality are correlated with amount of information remembered. For example, Brown and Kulik (1977) found that the percentage of subjects classified as having a flashbulb memory for an event, and the number of canonical informational categories included in free reports, were correlated with rated consequentiality. Furthermore, Pillemer (1984) found that rated surprise (but not rated consequentiality) was correlated with the number of canonical information categories represented in subjects' free reports of the circumstances of learning about the Reagan assassination attempt. However, these findings obviously fall far short of establishing a discontinuity between memories created under conditions in which both surprise and consequentiality are high, and memories created under other conditions. Furthermore, Neisser (1982) and Winograd and Killinger (1983) have pointed out that flashbulb-like memories occur for events that are not surprising in the sense of being unexpected, such as the landing on the moon in 1969, the resignation of Richard Nixon, or the death of General Franco, and Pillemer (1984) noted that flashbulb memories for the assassination attempt on President Reagan occurred even among subjects who rated the event as inconsequential. Finally, Pillemer (1984) interpreted his results as suggesting a graded effect of surprise or emotional reaction on the amount of information subjects can remember, and not an all-or-none effect of the sort that might be expected on the basis of the special-mechanism hypothesis.

of learning about a surprising, consequential event does not have the same sort of public significance as the event itself, it may nonetheless have personal significance for the individual. For example, Neisser (1982) suggests that memories for the circumstances of learning about newsworthy public events perform the important function of tying one's personal "time line" to the time line of public events: "They are the places where we line up our own lives with the course of history itself and say 'I was there.'" (Neisser, 1982, p. 48; see also Brewer, 1986, and Rubin & Kozin, 1984.)

As well as being personally significant, experiences in which one learns of a surprising, consequential event are likely to be distinctive. For example, a meeting that is interrupted by the announcement that the President of the United States has been assassinated is, by virtue of the announcement alone, a very unusual meeting. The significant departures from routine that are likely to follow the announcement (e.g., the adjournment of the meeting, the seeking of additional information from radio or television) may contribute further to the distinctiveness of the experience.

Other factors might also be mentioned in this context. For example, experiences of learning about a surprising, consequential event may be rehearsed covertly as one thinks about the experience, or overtly as one recounts it to others (Neisser, 1982). Furthermore, experiences of learning about shocking events are, at the least, interesting personal experiences: The news itself, the shock we feel, the departures from routine that ensue, and so forth, clearly render these experiences more interesting than the mundane events of everyday life.

It is commonly accepted that the strength and durability of memories produced by ordinary memory mechanisms are influenced by factors such as the distinctiveness of the to-be-remembered material, the interest and significance it holds for the individual, and the extent to which it is rehearsed. If, then, experiences in which one learns of a surprising, consequential event are indeed more significant, distinctive, or interesting than the commonplace experiences of everyday life, or more often rehearsed, there is reason to expect that ordinary mechanisms would yield considerably better memory for the former than for the latter. More generally, experiences in which one learns about events may, as the events themselves are increasingly surprising and consequential, be increasingly significant, distinctive, and so forth, and therefore increasingly memorable.

As soon as we recognize that ordinary memory mechanisms would not necessarily yield very poor memory for the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential events, we can see that the weak version of the special-mechanism hypothesis is in serious trouble. To the extent we accept that ordinary memory mechanisms could support reasonably good memory for experiences of learning about shocking events (and note that reasonably good recall, and not perfect recall, is what the weak claims assume), there is no need to postulate a special flashbulb memory mechanism.

Of course, our analysis of what can be expected from ordinary memory mechanisms is not beyond question. However, proponents of the special-mechanisms hypothesis clearly carry the burden of demonstrating that ordinary memory mechanisms could not support reasonably good memory for

the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential events. However, no such demonstration has been made.

A Conceptual Problem

In addition to inadequate empirical motivation, the special-mechanism hypothesis suffers from a serious conceptual problem. Although studies of flashbulb memory have focused on memory for the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential events, it has not been suggested that the flashbulb-memory mechanism evolved in response to a need to record these circumstances. Rather, proponents of the special mechanism hypothesis argue that the primary purpose of the special mechanism is to record surprising, consequential events in which the individual is directly involved (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977, pp. 97-99; Pillemer, 1984, pp. 65-66). That the mechanism also records the circumstances of *learning about* surprising and consequential events is viewed as a largely accidental consequence of the fact that high levels of surprise and consequentiality may be associated not only with direct involvement in important events, but also with the learning about such events. For example, Brown and Kulik (1977) stated that

What surely had to be printed neurologically and put in permanent store was not the circumstances of an unexpected and biologically significant event, but the event itself. To survive and leave progeny, the individual human had to keep his expectations of significant events up to date and close to reality. A marked departure from the ordinary in a consequential domain would leave him unprepared to respond adequately and endanger his survival. The "Now print!" mechanism [i.e., the special flashbulb memory mechanism] must have evolved because of the selection value of permanently retaining biologically crucial, but unexpected events....

...Probably the same "Now print!" mechanism accounts both for the enduring significant memories in which one has played the role of protagonist and those in which one has only been a member of an interested audience of millions. (Brown & Kulik, 1977, pp. 97-99).

What is curious about this argument is the underlying assumption that a special mechanism would be required for individuals to remember very important events in which they were directly involved. The need to remember such events is certainly clear; but why would a special mechanism be required to do so? The implicit claim is that ordinary memory mechanisms are so impoverished that they could not support good memory for even the most important events in which an individual is involved. This is an extraordinary claim, much more radical and far less defensible than the claim that ordinary mechanisms are not powerful enough to record the circumstances surrounding our learning of surprising, consequential events.

Concluding Remarks

In this article we have endeavored to assess the theoretical implications of flashbulb memories. On the basis of empirical observations and logical arguments, we have concluded that claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories strong

enough to motivate positing a special flashbulb-memory mechanism are untenable, and that weaker, more defensible claims do not provide sufficient grounds for asserting that flashbulb memories are so special as to require postulation of a special memory mechanism.

As an alternative to the special-mechanism hypothesis, we have suggested that flashbulb memories may be viewed as memories for significant and distinctive personal experiences, and hence as memories explicable in terms of ordinary memory mechanisms. From this perspective, two final observations may be offered. First, our viewpoint (see also Rubin & Kozin, 1984) suggests that the distinction between the flashbulb memories and other sorts of autobiographical memories is an artificial and arbitrary one. Memories for experiences of learning about surprising, consequential events are continuous in their characteristics with other autobiographical memories, and conform to the same principles. The experience of learning about an event may be more significant, distinctive, and so forth—and therefore more memorable—as the event itself is more surprising and consequential, but there is no qualitative distinction to be drawn between memories for learning about shocking, important events, and memories for learning about expected, trivial events.

A related observation has to do with research on the flashbulb-memory phenomenon. By adopting as a starting point the position that a special memory mechanism is required to account for flashbulb memories, proponents of the special-mechanism hypothesis have stressed the disconnection between these memories and more “ordinary” memories, thus insulating the research from theory and data regarding normal memory. In contrast, the present analysis has led us to embrace a view in which flashbulb memories fall squarely within the domain of normal memory (see also Rubin & Kozin, 1984). Working within this framework, our conceptions of flashbulb memories must be informed by data and theory concerning normal memory; and conversely, the study of

flashbulb memories should help to illuminate our understanding of normal memory.

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Received September 14, 1987

Revision received November 30, 1987

Accepted December 4, 1987 ■